


Top Secret




HR



STAFF NOTES:

**Middle East
Africa
South Asia**


State Department review completed



Top Secret

25X1

140



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400170001-9

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400170001-9

MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA

25X1

C O N T E N T S

Iran: Anti-Israeli Vote Explained.....	1
United Arab Emirates: Soviets Resume Diplomatic Probe.....	2
Arab States: Under Turkish Cultivation.....	3
Pakistan: Sind Chief Minister Increasingly Prominent.....	7

July 24, 1975

Iran*Anti-Israeli Vote Explained*

In a meeting on Tuesday with the US embassy's political officer, an Iranian foreign ministry official explained Tehran's vote for the resolution adopted at the Islamic Conference in Jidda last week that calls for Israel's expulsion from the UN.

The official stated candidly that Iran did not agree with the resolution, but decided not to oppose it because of Tehran's efforts to achieve closer relations with the Arabs. He added that his government believes it would be impossible to expel Israel from the UN. If the issue is raised there, however, Iran would most likely abstain; it could not oppose expulsion outright. He said Iran's position has been explained to the Israelis and they "understood."

Prime Minister Hoveyda told visiting White House Fellows on the same day that Iran had made clear to the Arabs that it did not agree with the suggestion that Israel be expelled because it would serve no useful purpose. Iran's national policy, he added, was to support UN Resolution 242. He regretted it had not been carried out, but expulsion was not the remedy.

Although the Shah wants to indicate to the US and Israel that Iran is not fully embracing the Arab side of the Middle East dispute, he would not be unhappy if the net result of the expulsion move is to increase the pressure on Tel Aviv to be more flexible. The Shah, who has thought for some time that Tel Aviv is too intransigent, believes the Israelis should seize the opportunity they have at present to make peace with President Sadat. The Iranian monarch is expressing this view with increasing frequency and vehemence.

[REDACTED]

July 24, 1975

1

United Arab Emirates

Soviets Resume Diplomatic Probe

The Soviet Union, eager to strengthen its position on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf where its only embassy is in Kuwait, is again attempting to establish diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At the moment, the ball is being carried by surrogates on behalf of Moscow.

25X1

The Soviet diplomatic initiative suggests that Moscow may be hoping for a more favorable political climate in the Gulf since King Faysal's death in late March. In 1972, Sheikh Zayid--the UAE president--and several other Gulf rulers appeared to be ready to exchange ambassadors with Moscow, but backed off in deference to Faysal's strong opposition to an expanded Soviet presence in the region.

Whether the UAE embraces the current Soviet-inspired overtures may depend on how Zayid reads the Saudi position. Those UAE officials who look favorably on ties with communist governments--UAE Foreign Minister Suwaydi heads the list--have undoubtedly been heartened by some signals of a softening by Riyadh on the issue.

Saudi Crown Prince Fahd has recently stated that his country follows an open door policy towards all countries and wants "good relations with both East and West." It is highly doubtful that the Saudi government will itself make any abrupt policy changes, but Fahd may be signaling a long-term shift in Riyadh's traditionally strong anti-communist policy. This could certainly encourage Moscow to pursue its efforts in the Gulf.

25X1

July 24, 1975

2

Arab States*Under Turkish Cultivation*

The Turks have launched a concerted effort to expand relations with neighboring Arab states. The Turks' campaign may produce some dividends but is unlikely to result in a reorientation of basic foreign policies. Ankara's attempts to cultivate its Arab and Muslim neighbors were underscored at last week's Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Jidda, where Turkey conditionally accepted a resolution calling for Israel's expulsion from the UN General Assembly and, to everyone's surprise, offered to host next year's conference.

Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash have been shuttling around the Arab world seeking to neutralize Arab support for the Greek Cypriots. They have been emphasizing Turkey's historic ties with the Islamic nations, alleged Greek desecrations of Muslim religious sites in Cyprus, and, most importantly, Turkish support for the Arabs in their dispute with Israel.

Turkey's relations with Israel have been on the decline for the past ten years, but have taken a turn for the worse since the 1973 war and the latest Cyprus imbroglio.

[REDACTED]

same time, however, Turkey is:

At the

-- Calling for Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands, Jerusalem in particular, and to grant the Palestinians their "legitimate rights."

-- Inviting the PLO to open an office in Turkey.

(Continued)

July 24, 1975

3

-- Refusing to allow the US to use Turkish facilities to resupply Israeli forces while permitting some Soviet overflights in support of Arab countries.

-- Sponsoring a UN resolution condemning Israeli "desecrations" of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.

25X1

Although the need for diplomatic backing has been the main impetus for Turkey to expand its Arab ties, other, less ephemeral factors also contribute.

Like its European neighbors, Turkey has been seeking a guaranteed oil supply at concessionary rates. To help ensure a steady flow of oil, Turkey signed an agreement last January with Libya that will supply the Turks with 60,000 barrels of oil a day.

25X1

(Continued)

July 24, 1975

4

Turkey has also completed an agreement with Iraq for construction of a joint crude oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, where a refinery will be built. Under the agreement, Baghdad will pay Ankara \$.35 per barrel of crude for transit and terminal fees and will guarantee Ankara's petroleum supply. In return, Ankara will purchase 200,000 barrels per day beginning in 1977.

Turkey has quietly supported Baghdad's efforts to suppress the Kurdish separatist movement. Ankara feared that continued unrest among Iraqi Kurds would spill over into southeastern Turkey.

Turkey's foreign currency reserves, which had grown by \$728 million in 1973, decreased by \$430 million in 1974, largely because of higher oil prices and a pronounced slowdown in workers' remittances. To offset the reduced capital inflow, Caglayangil, during his visit to the Persian Gulf this week, has laid the groundwork for expanded economic, political, and cultural cooperation with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The Turkish-Libyan accord also calls for shifting 4,000 Turkish workers from Europe to Libya and for Turkey to help meet Libya's food import requirements with sheep and cattle.

Domestic politics have also contributed to Turkey's increased interest in developing ties with the Arabs. Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party, currently serves as deputy prime minister in Demirel's coalition government. Erbakan and his supporters have long agitated for closer ties with the Islamic world, as opposed to NATO and the "secularized" governments of Western Europe. Erbakan has made numerous visits to Arab states and last year became the first cabinet minister to make the pilgrimage to Mecca in the fifty-year history of the Turkish Republic.

(Continued)

July 24, 1975

5

While both Turkey and the Arabs recognize the economic and diplomatic benefits of improved relations, there are practical limits on how far either side can proceed. After centuries of Ottoman occupation, the atavistic mistrust between Turks and Arabs still persists. For the Turks ever to qualify for large scale Arab subventions, they would have to break all ties with Israel, and at the very least, lessen ties with NATO and take on a more nonaligned foreign policy. The Turks are not ready to do either.

The Turks will pursue Arab support to the extent that it does not require a radical divergence from the basically Western and secular principles of the Ataturkist revolution. The Turks are aware that when all economic, political, and military factors are considered, the Arabs do not represent a viable option to NATO, CENTO, and the Western bloc.

July 24, 1975

Pakistan*Sind Chief Minister Increasingly Prominent*

The successful handling of a recent kidnapping incident by the Chief Minister of Sind Province, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, appears to have added to Jatoi's reputation as one of Pakistan's more effective high officials. Jatoi could well become one of the main contenders for the prime ministership at some future date when Prime Minister Bhutto leaves the scene.

Jatoi's intervention following the kidnapping of the Sind provincial transportation minister by disgruntled students last week led to the minister's release, unharmed, two days later. Jatoi agreed to consider the students' demand for better transportation facilities, but he refused to yield to their other demands, which included a call for the release of a detained Sindhi separatist leader. He threatened the kidnappers with "stringent punitive action" and showed he meant business by having the police raid dormitories and arrest about 100 students.

Jatoi has been chief minister of Sind since December 1973. Before that he was a minister in Bhutto's federal cabinet. Now 44, he is, like Bhutto, the scion of a prominent Sindhi landowning family and has been active in Pakistani politics since the 1950s. Bhutto named him to the Sind post to replace Mumtaz Bhutto, the Prime Minister's cousin, who had antagonized some regional and ethnic groups in the province. Mumtaz is Jatoi's main political rival in Sind.

Jatoi is generally viewed as having done a reasonably good job as chief minister. Under his stewardship the province has been relatively stable, and the local popularity of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, of which Jatoi is a leading member, appears to have been maintained. Jatoi has been described by US officials as an effective conciliator, apparently honest, and decisive when necessary.

(Continued)

July 24, 1975

7

Should something happen unexpectedly to Bhutto, Jatoi appears to be one of the few persons who might be able to garner enough support within the nationally dominant People's Party to become leader of the party and the government. As a Sindhi, Jatoi is not enmeshed in the factional bickering that divides the party in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province. Although he was embarrassed recently when one of his two wives, an Anglo-Indian, engaged in a flagrant love affair in Karachi, his political standing does not appear to have been seriously damaged.

25X1

July 24, 1975

8

25X1

Top Secret



Top Secret